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ADJUDICATING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
IN THREE EASY STEPS
David M. Schlachter*
INTRODUCTION
Celebrities’ names, images, and identities are unique and
valuable entities.1 The right of publicity was created to protect
these entities. While celebrities usually have wealth, fame, and
prestige, they also have the right of publicity to protect their
personas. This additional advantage is warranted because
celebrities have a set of heightened property and privacy interests
in their personas.2 The right of publicity, therefore, makes it
unlawful to misappropriate a valuable identity without permission.3
Courts have historically struggled to define the right of
publicity. This difficulty is apparent in inconsistent approaches to
defining the right.4 Without a firm definition of the right of
publicity, courts are left to question its necessity, how far the right
should extend, and who may bring a cause of action under the
right’s authority. Furthermore, issues such as whether the right of
publicity is derived from privacy or property jurisprudence, and
*

B.A., Brooklyn College, CUNY; J.D. candidate, 2006, Brooklyn Law
School. The author extends his sincere gratitude to Professor Aaron D. Twerski
for his guidance, and to Brooke Crescenti, Michael Freedman, and Beth
Lemanowicz for their stellar efforts in preparing this Note for publication.
1
A celebrity is one that is widely known or celebrated, or is honored for
some signal achievement. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2003). A celebrity does not have to be a member of the entertainment
world. Id.
2
See text infra § I.
3
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
4
See text infra §I.
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whether the First Amendment right to freedom of expression
serves to limit or expand the right of publicity, also contribute to
the confusion surrounding this right. Such uncertainty has led
courts to apply varying and divergent methods of adjudicating a
right of publicity cause of action. Therefore, both plaintiffs and
defendants are left with little guidance on how to litigate cases
which deal with the right of publicity.
The purpose of this Note is to untangle the right of publicity
and annunciate its defining issues. Part I explains the right’s
foundation and the various privacy and property interests that the
right of publicity protects. Part II discusses the interaction of the
right of publicity with the First Amendment, explaining how
varying degrees of First Amendment protection act as a restraint on
the right of publicity. Part III highlights the necessity of a new
uniform test and examines flaws in current right of publicity
jurisprudence, reflecting a lack of understanding of the right that
leads to confusion and injustice. Finally, Part IV suggests a new
three-prong test to consistently adjudicate right of publicity actions
and applies the new test to several fact patterns for illustrative
purposes.
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In order to understand the right of publicity, one must first have
an understanding of its roots in the law. The right of publicity has
no direct ancestor in common law. Rather, it developed from two
areas of law: privacy5 and intellectual property.6 The term “right of
publicity” was first coined in the 1953 case of Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.7 In Haelan, the
court derived the right of publicity from the right to privacy,
5

Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
967 (10th Cir. 1996) (the right of publicity “was originally intertwined with the
right of privacy”).
6
Parks, 329 F.3d at 449. The court points out that right of publicity claims
follow those of trademark claimsthat the two causes of action are similar. Id.
at 447. Thereby, the court asserts that the right of publicity falls under the
general category of intellectual property. Id. at 449.
7
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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holding that individuals have a right to be protected from unwanted
public exposure.8 The court coined the term “right of publicity
because it protected the publicity value of one’s photograph.”9 The
right also drew from property law, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.10
In Zacchini, the Court held that if there is market value in any part
of a person, such as the person’s image, that person should be able
to protect that value through equitable and monetary remedies.11
Thus, the holdings in Haelan Laboratories and Zacchini
demonstrate that the right of publicity was earliest identified as a
unique derivative of both privacy and property jurisprudence.
A. The Privacy Aspect of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is partly derived from the right to
privacy.12 At common law, an individual’s right to privacy can be
invaded in a variety of ways.13 One type of invasion of the right to
8

Id. See also Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal.

2001).
9

Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.
433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
11
Id. In other words, if a celebrity has market value in his or her likeness,
i.e., his or her photograph can be sold in the free market, then that celebrity
should be granted some sort of protection for that likeness. This protection will
bar the use of the likeness by others without permission. See id. Since this
ruling, many other courts have followed this line of reasoning and have ruled
that the right of publicity is a right derived from intellectual property law. See,
e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003).
12
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). See
also Parks, 329 F.3d at 445 (stating that the Lanham Act, to which right of
publicity is similar, is rooted in the right to privacy); Landham v. Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996); Haelan Labratories,
202 F.2d at 868; Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (stating that the right of publicity is derived from the common law right to
privacy); Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799.
13
Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. The four categories are: (1) “Intrusion
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude,” or into private affairs; (2) Public
exposure of private facts about the plaintiff; (3) “Publicity which places the
10
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privacy akin to the right of publicity is the appropriation of an
individual’s name or image for another’s advantage.14 This type of
misappropriation served as the basis for the right of publicity’s
roots in privacy law.15 “Name or image” is the persona or publicity
value that a celebrity is trying to protect.16 The appropriation of the
name or image of another, for one’s own benefit, has been
extended from a cause of action of the right to privacy to a cause of
action under the right of publicity.17 In fact, when both causes of
action are applicable, many courts limit the pleadings to only the
claims under the right of publicity.18
Deriving the right of publicity from the common law of privacy
has various implications.19 For example, while New York
recognizes the right of publicity, the state imposes limitations
owing to its privacy law jurisprudence.20 The New York courts
have ruled that because the right of publicity is grounded in
theories of privacy, it only protects identity so long as the injured
party is alive,21 holding that there is no privacy issue after a person
dies.22 New York has also limited the right of publicity’s remedies
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye” and (4) Appropriation of the plaintiff’s
identity for the defendant’s benefit. Id.
14
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 n.2 (Cal. 2001). See
also Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
15
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799; Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
16
Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. “In asserting that Defendants breached
her ‘common law right to persona and image,’ Plaintiff Bosley alleges the fourth
cause of actionappropriation of her name or likeness for the defendant’s
advantage.” Id.
17
Landham, 227 F.3d at 622.
18
The right of publicity extends beyond the general right to privacy. Parks
v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the right of
publicity incorporates the right to privacy claim. See id.
19
As a consequence of deriving the right of publicity from the common law
right of privacy, the right of publicity has non-economic attributes. Since many
courts find the right of publicity to have been created through the right to
privacy, those courts attribute several non-economic values to the right. See text
infra this section.
20
Zoll v. Ruder Finn Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
21
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d. 620, 621 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977); Zoll, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7.
22
Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621.
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to injunctive relief and nominal damages,23 because the theoretical
basis of privacy law is to prevent injury to feelings. 24 Thus, most
awards in actions for the wrongful invasion of an individual’s right
of publicity in New York, and other states which view the right of
publicity wholly as a derivative of the right to privacy, are limited
to nominal damages. 25
Holding that the right of publicity is derived from privacy also
implicates the remedy of unjust enrichment.26 “Unjust enrichment
is a judicially created remedy for avoiding benefit to one to the
unfair detriment of another.”27 Indeed, the remedy of unjust
enrichment rests on the basis that allowing the free appropriation
of a celebrity’s identity serves no social purpose.28 In order to
establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) the defendant received a benefit, (2) at
plaintiff’s expense, (3) under circumstances that would make it
unjust for the defendant to retain benefit without paying for it.29
Thus, appropriating the likeness of another for capital gain,
without permission, will serve as the basis for an unjust enrichment
claim, because the celebrity loses marketability of the likeness
23

Zoll, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7.
Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621.
In New York there is a distinction between the statutory right which
protects the living persons from commercial exploitation of their names
and pictures without their written consents, as embodied in sections 50
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, and the common-law
property right in one’s public personality. The statutory right is deemed
a ‘right of privacy’ and is based upon the classic right of privacy’s
theoretical base, which is to prevent injury to feelings. Accordingly, in
most cases where damages have been awarded under the Civil Rights
law, they have been nominal.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
25
Id.
26
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
976 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 576 (1977)).
27
Martinez v. Colo. Dep’t. of Human Servs., 97 P.3d 152, 159 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003).
28
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
29
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004).
24
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while the appropriator receives economic benefit.30
B. The Property Aspect of the Right of Publicity
In addition to privacy characteristics, many courts attribute
property interests to the right of publicity.31 Even Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,32 which considered the
right as mainly a protection of the privacy interest of ballplayers,
stated that there is some economic, or property, aspect to the right
of publicity.33 Furthermore, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., the United States Supreme Court noted that the
right of publicity exists more to protect an individual’s right to
reap the rewards of his endeavors than to protect an individual’s
feelings or reputation.34 Trademark law plays a key role in this
respect.35 Thus, the concept of the economic property value of the
Fifth Amendment has developed as an equal or competing issue
alongside the personal privacy interests in the right of publicity.
In order to prevail on a right of publicity claim, one need not be
a celebrity.36 As far as the economic property value is concerned,
courts have long recognized the property interests in identities as
30

Id. For further explanation of how the celebrity loses likeness
marketability, see text infra Part III(A).
31
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967. Although many courts consider the right as a
legislative offspring of the right to privacy, most find several additional property
interests in the right of publicity. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76; Donchez,
392 F.3d at 1220; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir.
2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003); Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001); Landham v.
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2000); Cardtoons, 95
F.3d at 973; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920
(N.D. Ohio 2004); Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
2001) (all attributing property characteristics to the right of publicity).
32
202 F.2d at 868. This court first coined the term “right of publicity.”
33
Id.
34
433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977).
35
Parks, 329 F.3d at 460; Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
36
Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
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the inherent right of every person to control the commercial value
of his or her identity.37 However, this right extends only to
individuals that have an identity with commercial value.38 It is this
value that the right of publicity is protecting.39 The identity of an
individual, thus, has pecuniary value with accompanying rights
which may be asserted if that value is diminished by the wrongful
actions of someone else.40
A valuable identity is created by a mixture of hard work and
talent.41 A highly valuable identity is attained when the name,
image, or likeness of an individual is readily identifiable to the
public.42 Celebrities, or those individuals who have achieved a
highly valuable identity, should have the right to enjoy the fruits of
their labor.43 It follows that endorsement value—the ability of
celebrities to license to advertisers the use of their image or
likeness—is a protectable property interest.44 The right of
publicity, then, clearly has economic components.45 In simplest
form, it protects an individual’s hard work behind obtaining
celebrity status.46 Likewise, the right prevents others from
37

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928-29 (6th Cir. 2003);
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
38
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992). See also
Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183-84.
39
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
967 (10th Cir. 1996).
40
Haelan Laboratories, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1953).
41
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001).
42
Id.
43
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975. The court considers this a “noneconomic”
justification. Id. Yet, the court also explains this right by stating that the
celebrity must practice for years in order to gain marketable status. Id. If it is
marketable status that the celebrity attains, it is hard to see how this is a
noneconomic justification for the right of publicity.
44
Id. at 974; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 952 (6th Cir.
2003) (Clay J., dissenting).
45
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807. “[T]he right of publicity is essentially an
economic right.” Id.
46
ETW, 332 F.3d at 957-58 (Clay, J., dissenting) (citing Comedy III, 21
P.3d at 802-05).
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exploiting the good name and will that the celebrity has attained
for him or herself.47 The right of publicity, therefore, makes it
unlawful to misappropriate a valuable identity.48 As this aspect of
the right is economic, the right extends to the celebrity’s heirs.49
Another economic characteristic of the right of publicity is its
similarity to intellectual property law.50 Intellectual property law
generally, and trademark law specifically, grants an individual a
civil cause of action against one who wrongfully uses a trademark
without the owner’s permission.51 A trademark is a symbol or
device that is adopted by the mark owner, to the exclusion of use
by all other persons, in order to distinguish the goods or property
made or sold by the owner.52 Just as trademark law protects the
trademark owner’s exclusive use of the commercial identification
47

Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001).
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004). It
would be futile for an advertiser or anyone else to appropriate an identity that
had no value. Such appropriation would not provide the advertiser with any
benefit. Advertisers after all, seek to gain marketability from the appropriation.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
Advertisers use celebrities to promote their products. The more popular
the celebrity, the greater the number of people who recognize her, and
the greater the visibility for the product. The identities of the most
popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as
name, likeness, or voice.
Id. Therefore, the assumption here is that the identities dealt with have some
commercial value.
49
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 805.
50
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,
447 (6th Cir. 2003); Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (stating that trademark
protection is a property right protection).
51
Trade-Mark, 100 U.S. at 92.
52
Id. The Court gives a brief summary of trademark rights:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods
or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the
exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the
common law and the chancery courts of England and of this country,
and by the statutes of some States.
Id.
48
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of a product, the right of publicity protects the individual
celebrity’s exclusive use of the commercial identifications of him
or herself.53 Additionally, in the same way that misuse of a
trademark may lead to consumer confusion about a product not
associated with the trademark owner, the misuse of a celebrity’s
name or image in association with a product might lead to
consumer confusion about whether the celebrity endorsed the
product.54 Avoiding such consumer confusion is a goal shared by
trademark law and the right of publicity.55
Finally, in addition to preventing mark confusion, another
protection afforded by trademark law is the prevention of mark
dilution.56 Dilution occurs in two situations: (1) when the value of
the mark is degraded, which occurs when an identity is used freely,
lessening any endorsement value it may have, or (2) when the
value of the mark is tarnished, which occurs when an exploiter
attaches obscene, pornographic, or base material to the image.57 In
this way, the right of publicity is again similar to trademark law
because it protects the endorsement value of the celebrity’s name
or image and also protects against the tarnishing of the celebrity’s
name or image, albeit to a lesser degree.58
It is clear from courts’ use of the right of publicity in protecting
privacy and property interests, as well as its similarity to trademark
law, that the right is well-grounded in property jurisprudence and
privacy jurisprudence. The rights associated with property and
privacy have long been acknowledged as basic and fundamental
rights.59 As with all rights, however, the right of publicity is not

53

Id.
Id. at 446.
55
Id. at 445. The goal of the Lanham Act was to avoid “confusion among
consumers or to cause consumers to make a mistake or to deceive consumers.”
Id. For further discussion, see text infra § I(B).
56
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 2004).
57
Id.
58
Id. at 777-78. The right of publicity concerns itself more with
endorsement value and preventing exploitation of the fame of the celebrity, than
with name tarnishing. See text infra IV(B)(b).
59
U.S. CONST. amends. V and IV, respectively.
54
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absolute.60 The First Amendment is an important competing and
limiting factor on the use of the right of publicity.61
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S INTERACTION WITH THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
Defendants in right of publicity actions often assert the First
Amendment as an affirmative defense.62 The First Amendment
protects certain speech from governmental regulation.63 There are
various levels of First Amendment protection and courts have
taken degree-oriented approaches. For instance, newscasts on
matters of public interest enjoy a very high degree of protection.64
Expressive materials sold for profit also retain some First
Amendment protection,65 but enjoy a lower level of protection
because the danger of consumer deception warrants some
governmental regulation.66 Books and movies have a high level of
protection because they are vehicles through which ideas and
opinions are disseminated;67 less so for posters and other forms of
merchandise having a commercial interest.68
A. Free Speech Protection & its Limitations
First Amendment protection is far reaching but is limited by
certain public interests.69 The Supreme Court found the
60

See text infra § II.
Id.
62
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001). See
Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477-78 (Cal. 2003).
63
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
968 (10th Cir. 1996). Application of statute or common law by a court satisfies
this state action requirement. Id.
64
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977).
65
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 n.5
(1988).
66
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989).
67
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
68
Parks, 329 F.3d at 449; Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430.
69
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
61
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distribution of pamphlets,70 circulation of handbills,71 display of
yard signs,72 flag burning,73 nude dancing,74 and jackets bearing
profanity75 all to be protected by the First Amendment.
Entertaining speech, like informative speech, is protected.76 Art
does not even need a message in order to be protected.77
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the right. Legitimate and
actual expression receives the highest degree of First Amendment
protection.78 However, the degree of protection decreases when the
primary goal of the work is to market or sell the work or another
item.79 Works with minimal expression which primarily try to sell
another product, such as advertisements, have the least First
969 (10th Cir. 1996). “This case instead requires us to directly balance the
magnitude of the speech restriction against the asserted governmental interest in
protecting the intellectual property right. We thus begin our analysis by
examining the importance of Cardtoons’ right to free expression and the
consequences of limiting that right.” Id. at 972. See also Smith v. Daily Mail
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“Historically, we
have viewed freedom of speech and of the press as indispensable to a free
society and its government. But recognition of this proposition has not meant
that the public interest in free speech and press always has prevailed over
competing interests of the public.”).
70
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938).
71
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
72
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
73
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
74
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
75
Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 29 (1971).
76
Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
969 (10th Cir. 1996).
77
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001).
78
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003).
79
See id. at 454. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the court states that
when there is First Amendment protection, there is no need to even check for
consumer confusion or deception. 332 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2003). “[W]e
conclude that where the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use
of celebrity’s identity is protected by the First Amendment, the likelihood of
confusion test is not appropriate because it fails to adequately consider the
interests protected by the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added). This is bad
law. Even if there is a valid and ‘colorable’ First Amendment claim, the court
still needs to see if there is consumer confusion. If there is confusion, then the
First Amendment protection will be diminished. See text infra § II(B).
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Amendment protection.80 For commercial messages and
advertisements, the First Amendment yields to the greater public
interest in truthful and accurate commercial speech.81 Thus, the
fact that there is a message conveyed by a work does not mean that
the message will be protected by the First Amendment.82
The First Amendment also yields to copyright and trademark
law.83 Copyright and trademark law protects authors and creators
of works from infringement by others.84 These laws prevent people
from creating works which are confusingly similar to those of
another.85 In preventing people from making infringing works, the
infringer’s First Amendment right to free speech must again yield
to the greater public interest in allowing creators to retain
ownership of their innovations.86
B. Commercial Speech Is More Vulnerable to Regulation
As mentioned above, commercial speech is afforded less First
Amendment protection than artistic or informational speech.87
Although the boundary between commercial and noncommercial
speech has yet to be clearly defined, at its core, commercial speech
80

Parks, 329 F.3d at 447. The First Amendment only protects the
expressive elements in a work. It does not protect any part of a work that is not
expressive. Incidentally, if there are enough expressive elements in a work, the
whole work will be under First Amendment protection. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at
810.
81
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
82
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2004).
83
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.
Supp. 366, 375 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). “It has long been settled in our jurisprudence
that rights of free expression, embodied in the First Amendment and other legal
doctrines, are subject to rights under the copyright and trademark laws.” Id.
84
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989). A trademark is
infringed upon when an exploiter uses the trademark without permission. Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. It would be inimical to the protections of the First Amendment if the
law did not recognize the right of creators to protect their creative work against
infringement by other creators. Id.
87
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996).
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aims to facilitate commercial transactions by attracting consumers
to a product or service.88 The Supreme Court has determined,
therefore, that commercial speech will not be as highly protected
as other types of expression, such as newscasts, political
commentary, or art.89
Many right of publicity cases revolve around commercial
speech which uses the identity of a celebrity without permission.90
Examples include the use of a baseball player’s image in a printed
beer advertisement,91 the use of a basketball star’s former name in
a television car commercial,92 the imitation of a singer’s voice in a

88

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
Id.; Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2001). In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), the United States Supreme Court established a fourpart test to determine if commercial speech can be governmentally regulated:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within the
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Id.
90
Hoffman, 225 F.3d at 1185.
91
Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff Newcombe was an all-star Major League Baseball player. Id. at 689.
He was one of the first African-American ballplayers in Major League Baseball.
Id. Coors Brewing Co. published an advertisement which featured a drawing of
an old-time baseball game. Id. The drawing featured a pitcher in the windup
position which was immediately recognizable as Newcombe. Id.
92
Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996).
Famed basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s birth name was Ferdinand
Lewis (“Lew”) Alcindor. Id. While he used the name Abdul-Jabbar for
endorsement purposes, he never used his former name Alcindor. Id. A car
commercial, by defendant, featured the quote “Who holds the record for being
voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?” Id. Then the printed
words, “Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ‘67, ‘68, ‘69” appeared on the screen. Id.
Afterwards, the voiceover talks about the attributes of the Oldsmobile EightyEight. Id.
89
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radio snack-food advertisement,93 the use of a game-show hostess’
identity in a printed advertisement selling VCRs,94 and the soundalike rendition of a song that a popular singer recorded.95 In cases
such as these, the celebrity’s identity is used entirely for the
purposes of selling a product.96 The commercial aspects are
“inextricably entwined” with the expressive elements, which the
Court has found to be minimal.97 Our society has a market for the
exploitation of celebrities in order to sell products.98 Such
exploitation is “an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity’s
celebrity value.”99 In order for the marketing message to be
effective, the advertisement must clearly evoke the celebrity’s
identity.100 After all, if consumers do not realize that the celebrity
is associated with the product, the advertiser does not benefit from

93

Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1992). Waits
was a renowned singer, songwriter, and actor with a distinctive voice. Id. at
1097. He achieved both critical and commercial success in his career. Id. FritoLay, Inc. produced packaged chips. Id. In introducing a new product, the chip
company used one of Waits’ songs in a commercial. Id. The company also used
an imitator that sounded like Waits and “captured” his style. Id.
94
White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff White was the hostess of a popular game show with over forty-million
viewers daily. Id. In an advertising campaign, defendant used a robot which was
dressed and formed to resemble the famous hostess. Id. The robot had on a wig,
gown, and jewelry all modeled after the hostess. Id. The caption of the
advertisement read: Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D. Id.
95
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988). Midler was
a very popular and acclaimed actress and singer. Id. Defendant produced a
commercial that featured one of Midler’s songs. Id. After Midler turned down
the advertising company’s request to perform on the commercial, the advertising
company found another singer that “sounded exactly” like Midler. Id. While
neither a picture nor image of Midler was used in the commercial, the
commercial did feature the sound-alike singer singing one of Midler’s songs. Id.
96
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir.
2001).
97
Id. The Hoffman court found this to be true in all of the previous
examples. Id.
98
White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
99
Id. This is, if there is misappropriation. Id.
100
Id. At least clear enough to the point of recognition. Id.

SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC

4/18/2006 12:42 PM

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

485

exploiting the identity.101 Such an attempt to take a free ride at the
celebrity’s expense is impermissible under intellectual property
law.102
In general, courts have held that when an identity is exploited
in order to sell products which consist of the identity itself, such as
baseball cards, it is not considered commercial speech.103 Parodies
are a prime example, which are considered creative expression and
not commercial speech.104 They necessarily rely on evoking the
image of the target celebrity.105 Additionally, putting a literal
101

Id. “The more effective the evocation [of the identity], the better the
advertisement.” Id. If the ad is generic, then the ad would not violate the right of
publicity, but it would also not be all that effective. Id.
102
Id.
103
Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
976 (10th Cir. 1996).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 972. Parodies have an important place in our society. Id. “A
parodist, with deft and wit, can readily expose the foolish and absurd in society.”
Id. A parody is also a valuable form of self-expression. Id. It allows an artist to
shed light on earlier works and, at the same time, create new ones. Id. As a
means of social criticism and a means of self-expression, parodies are a vital
commodity in the marketplace of ideas. Id.
“Parodies of celebrities are an especially valuable means of expression
because of the role celebrities play in modern society.” Id. A celebrity is a
common point of reference for millions of individuals that share nothing else. Id.
They may never have interacted with each other, but they share the knowledge
of this celebrity. Id. Celebrities have come to symbolize many ideas through
their pervasive presence in the media. Id. “Celebrities then, are an important
element of the shared communicative resources of our cultural domain.” Id. A
parody of a celebrity does more than just lampoon that celebrity. It exposes the
weakness of the idea or value that that particular celebrity symbolizes in society.
Id. Thus, restricting the use of the celebrity in a parody restricts the
communication of ideas. Id.
Additionally, no endorsement value is diminished by the use of a celebrity
identity in a parody. Id. at 975. Celebrities do not want to endorse their own
criticism. If given the power to restrict the use of their identities for parodies,
they would censor, not endorse. That is, they would not sell their rights to
parodists. Id. They would, instead, bar the allowance of artists to parody them.
Id. Therefore, this power will turn into one of censorship, not protection. Id. For
the foregoing reasons, parodies receive extra protection. Id. at 976.
Additional insight into parody can be gained from Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
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depiction of a likeness on T-shirts may not constitute commercial
speech and would be afforded First Amendment protection if the
image were used expressively.106 Yet, if that likeness on the T-shirt
were used to market another product, such as a soft-drink, it would
likely be considered commercial speech and would not be afforded
First Amendment protection. The right of publicity prevents the
image from exploitation in such circumstances by making the
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Groups, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). The
plaintiff in that case was the producer of summaries on literary classics. Id. at
491. These summaries are widely used amongst students of all levels. Id. The
defendant created a three book series called Spy Notes. Id. at 492. It was a onetime parody of the famous Cliffs Notes. Id. Inside the books were humorous
content instead of serious comment. Id. However, the main issue was the cover
of the books. Id. Spy Notes copied every prominent feature of the cover of Cliffs
Notes. Id. However, there were some differences. The cover of Spy Notes
prominently stated five times in red lettering that it was a satire and bore the
notation “A Spy Book” along with the Spy Magazine logo. It also showed a clay
sculpture of New York City rather than the famous clay sculpture of a mountain
that is found on the cover of Cliffs Notes. Id. In light of these changes, and the
defendant’s expressive elements in the form of parody, the court found for the
defendants. Id. at 497.
In its ruling, the court stated that “parody is a form of artistic expression,
protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 493. Parody protection is so strong
that no recovery, under any cause of action, will be rewarded for injury caused
by parody, unless actual malice can be shown. Id. Thus, parody and satire
deserve substantial freedom. Id. That is both “as entertainment and as a form of
social and literary criticism.” Id. (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
The keystone of parody is imitation. Id. at 494. For a parody to be
successful it must evoke the major elements of its target. Id. “A parody must
convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original,
but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” Id. (emphasis in
original). To the extent that it only conveys that it is the original, without
conveying any parody, it not only is a poor parody, but will be vulnerable to
trademark law. Id. This is, because it confuses the consumer. Id. The better the
parody the less likely it is to cause confusion. Id. at 495. Alternatively, the
poorer the parody, the more likely it will be to cause consumer confusion. Id.
Therefore, parodies done well will receive protection, while poor parodies will
be vulnerable to intellectual property law. Id.
106
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001). In
Comedy III, the literal depiction was of The Three Stooges, a famed comedy
group. Id. at 801.
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misappropriation unlawful.107
Commercial speech retains significantly less First Amendment
protection than other speech in general because its main purpose is
to sell, not to be creative.108 Furthermore, commercial speech that
is misleading will not be afforded any First Amendment
protection.109 Speech that is a mixture of commercial promotion
and creative expression has only limited protection.110 It is likely in
these instances that the right of publicity will protect the image.111
The First Amendment will comport with the limitations imposed
by the right of publicity.112 Therefore, even if commercial speech
107

Id.
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
109
Id. at 925. “For example, the First Amendment does not shield from
liability commercial messages which contain misleading material or relate to
illegal activity.” Id.
110
Id. at 929.
111
Id.
112
Id. In Bosley, the district court enjoined the defendant from selling
images of the plaintiff, a regional celebrity, and from using her images to sell its
product. Id. at 936. Plaintiff was a local television news broadcaster, and
defendant was the distributor of a pornographic website. Id. The use of the
images did not involve any creative expression. Id. This case, however, is
pending appeal. Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11028, *1 (6th
Cir. 2004). Upon granting a stay to the injunction pending appeal, the circuit
court stated that the “present case ‘illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright
lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.’” Id. at *2.
Further, the court stated that it was “not persuaded, at th[at] stage in the
proceedings, that the defendant’s speech [wa]s outside the protection of the First
Amendment.” Id. It remains to be seen how the law will change, at least in the
6th Circuit. Based on the court’s language in the stay, it is reasonable to suspect
that the court will find for defendant on appeal.
In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit found for a defendant that used the image
and likeness of a professional golfer in a lithograph. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). Over five thousand reprints of the
lithograph were sold. Id. The court found that since the collage of images
depicted was combined to describe a historic event, the work was artistic. Id.
Therefore, the court found that the First Amendment protected the work. Id. In
other words, the court went so far to diminish the right of publicity, that it found
that First Amendment protection extends to literal depictions that are meant for
sale. It is very likely, then, that the same court will find that the First
Amendment also protects purely commercial speech; i.e., speech for the sole
108

SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC

488

4/18/2006 12:42 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

is also creative, it will not necessarily be granted First Amendment
protection if the purpose of the speech is primarily commercial.113
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST
A. The Unbalanced Approach Taken by the Courts
Surprisingly, few courts have tried to reconcile the right of
publicity with the First Amendment.114 Instead, courts just seem to
grapple blindly with the right.115 Some try their own balancing but
end up severely minimizing the right.116 Others arrive at the correct
outcome but for uncertain reasons.117 Unfortunately, such
uncertainty has resulted in confusion on how to litigate cases
involving the rights of publicity, and has even resulted in injustice
in some cases.118
For example, in Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball
Players Association, the plaintiff baseball card company produced
a series of parody cards lampooning various players in Major
League Baseball.119 In this declaratory judgment, defendant Major
League Baseball Player’s Association argued that the card
company’s unauthorized use of players’ likenesses diminished the
players’ licensing value, which generated over seventy percent of
their revenue.120 In discussing the rights of the parties, the Tenth
purpose of exploiting the identity of the celebrity in order to market a product.
This would, indeed, be a mistake. It would all but do away with the right of
publicity.
113
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2004).
114
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001).
115
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95
F.3d 959, 959-76 (10th Cir. 1996). See also infra this section.
116
ETW, 332 F.3d at 949 (Clay, J., dissenting). See also infra this section.
117
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1189
(9th Cir. 2001). See also infra this section.
118
See, e.g., Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2004). See also infra this section.
119
95 F.3d at 962. This case was a declaratory judgment not a lawsuit for
damages. Id.
120
Id. at 963.
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Circuit put forth many justifications for upholding the right of
publicity.121 However, the court curtly changed gears and granted
plaintiff’s petition for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff’s cards
did not infringe on the defendant’s publicity rights, after building
an extensive case for the defendant because plaintiff’s use of the
players’ likenesses did not diminish defendant’s endorsement
value.122 The court noted that the right of publicity reserves the
value of the identity to “advertisers who contract for the use of
[the] likeness.”123 Yet, the court also stated that “even in the
absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap
financial
reward
from
authorizing
appearances
and
124
endorsements.”
The court’s statements are contradictory,
because it first stated that endorsement value is preserved by
publicity rights, but then stated that endorsement value will thrive
regardless of publicity rights.125 The court acknowledged that “the
right of publicity is said to protect various noneconomic interests,
such as safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of celebrity
labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional
harm.”126 However, the court ultimately found all of these
justifications non-compelling and decided the case in favor of the
plaintiff.127 Instead of applying a clear standard to the rights, the
court struggled to find (and ultimately found) justification for
using a celebrity’s identity for parody.128
121

Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
967-76 (10th Cir. 1996). The court listed economic and noneconmic
justification. Id. at 973. The right’s economic goals include “stimulating athletic
and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and
protecting consumers.” Id. The right’s non-economic goals include
“safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of celebrity labors, preventing
unjust enrichment, and averting emotional harm.” Id.
122
Id. at 975-76.
123
Id. at 974-75. This is endorsement value. See id. at 975.
124
Id. at 974.
125
Id. at 974-75.
126
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973.
127
Id. at 976.
128
The court was mainly protecting the public interest in parodies. Id. at
972. Still, the fact that the case was about a parody seems to get lost in the
shuffle. Instead of focusing on this, the court stumbles its way through the
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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc. is a case which illustrates
how a bad balancing test can almost neutralize the right of
publicity. In ETW Corp., the defendant artist used the likeness of a
famous golfer in a drawing.129 This drawing contained three exact
likenesses of the golfer.130 Over five thousand prints of the
drawing were put on the market.131 The golfer sued for the
exploitation of his image.132 In its lengthy discussion, the court
adopted the “transformative elements test” for guidance.133 Even
though the court agreed that the depictions were a “literal
likeness,” it still refused to find for the plaintiff because it found
transformative elements in the fact that the drawing contained
more than one literal likeness.134 In a confusing manner, the court
stated that using a single literal depiction is not allowed, but using
a collage of images is permissible, because a collage of images
apparently has more expressive elements.135 This holding allows
policy considerations of the right of publicity. Id. at 973-76.
129
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). The
golfer was Tiger Woods. Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 935. The court stated that “the transformative elements test
adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III Productions, will
assist us in determining where the proper balance lies between the First
Amendment and Woods’s intellectual property rights.” Id. at 936. See also text
supra § IV(A).
The transformative elements test determines how directly the work at issue
has used the celebrity’s identity. Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
808 (Cal. 2001). If the work has just adopted a literal depiction of the identity,
then the work will be vulnerable to right of publicity protection. Id. If, however,
the work changed or added some elements to the identity, the work will be
afforded First Amendment protection. Id. See text infra § III(B) for further
explanation.
134
ETW, 332 F.3d at 938.
135
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003).
“Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods. Rather,
Rush’s work consists of a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image.” Id.
(emphasis added). The court reasoned that the multiple images created an
expressive element. Id. That is, it captured a moment in sports history. Id. This,
however, is a grave misconstruction. Id. at 959 (Clay, J., dissenting). The images
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imitators to exploit likenesses so long as more than one image is
used in a single work. In sum, the majority misapplies the law of
publicity.136
used in the drawing are nearly identical to those used in authorized Nike posters.
Id. The majority errs in not protecting the rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 960. “The
Majority’s failure to do so in this case is in complete contravention to the intent
of Congress, the principles of trademark law, and the well-established body of
jurisprudence in this area.” Id.
136
Id. at 948 (Clay, J., dissenting). The court in ETW seems to suggest that
having an actual depiction with a clever title will protect the work from publicity
liability. Id. at 938. “While the right of publicity allows celebrities . . . to enjoy
the fruits of their labors, here [the artist] has added a significant creative
component of his own to [the celebrity’s] identity,” the title of the work. Id.
When there is a collage of images together, suggesting a moment in sports
history, the use of the literal depictions will be protected. Id. All the more so
when the work has an artistic title. Id. at 919. Bosley v. Wildwett.com explained
the holding in ETW. 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2004). The court
explained that ETW did not directly address the role of the First Amendment in
advertising cases. Id. It was only speaking about an artistic work. Id. Note,
however, that this artistic work was trying to sell itself. ETW, 332 F.3d at 919. It
was not merely a single print, but over five thousand were put on the market. Id.
It is uncertain, then, that in a case where a product designer appropriates an
image, and uses it on the product itself, and not in advertising, whether ETW
would not control.
ETW should be overturned. The facts of the case do not pass the new test.
The artist used a collage of likenesses in a work of art. Id. at 918. The art was
reprinted over five thousand times, and put on the market for sale. Id. at 919.
The collage featured literal depictions of Tiger Woods, a superstar golfer, in his
signature poses. Id. at 918. In the accompanying literature, Woods’s name is
mentioned twice. Id. at 919.
Applying the factors of the test is not difficult in this case. The work has a
dual purpose. As it does seek to capture a moment in time, it is also focusing on
the celebrity Tiger Woods. The main purpose of the art is to capitalize off of the
fame that Tiger Woods worked hard to attain. The event depicts the day he
became the youngest player in sports history to win the Masters tournament. Id.
at 918. He also created a new 72-hole record in the tournament. Id. He has risen
to the pinnacle of his sport. Id. The artist is capitalizing off of this success.
Painting literal depictions is not any more expressive than putting together a
collage of photographs. The purpose is the same, to take advantage of another’s
fame for personal gain. True, the artist claims to commemorate an event, but he
is also exploiting an image.
This type of product leads to confusion and dilution. Such a
commemorative work will likely be seen by consumers as affiliated in some way
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On the other hand, the case of Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC
Inc. is an example where the Ninth Circuit arrived at the correct
ruling, but for the wrong reasons.137 Plaintiff actor Dustin Hoffman
starred in “Tootsie,” a movie in which he played a male actor who
dresses like a woman in order to get a part on a television soap
opera.138 A memorable still from the movie depicts the actor
dressed in a red long-sleeved sequined evening dress, posing in
front of an American flag.139 The defendant magazine publisher
published an article which contained altered photographs of
famous movies to make it appear that the actors were sporting the
current fall fashion.140 The final shot in the article was of the
memorable “Tootsie” still, altered by replacing the actor’s body
with that of a male model in the same pose, wearing a spaghettistrapped, cream-colored, silk evening dress.141 The actor sued,
claiming that the magazine was tortuously exploiting his
identity.142 The court reasoned that using an identity for
commercial purposes is beyond the scope of First Amendment
protection.143 However, the court found that the altered photo was
not used to sell the fall line, just to present the trick photography,
instead of stating that there were expressive elements in the
work.144 Thus, the correct holding—that the magazine can use the
to the player. The poses shown, after all, are identical to the ones used in Nike
posters that are endorsed by the celebrity. Id. at 947 (Clay, J., dissenting). Aside
from confusion, there is also dilution. Tiger Woods would want to sell the rights
to such a project. Especially since it is commemorative, it views him in the
greatest light possible. Therefore, there is a great likelihood of confusion and
dilution.
Summary judgment should have been awarded to Woods.
137
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
138
Id. at 1182.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1183.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir.
2001). “If the altered photograph had appeared in a Ralph Lauren advertisement,
then we would be facing” a different kind of case, one where the right of
publicity will be upheld. Id.
144
Id. Therefore, it could be argued that the photograph had a clear
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image—was arrived at, but with the wrong analysis—due to lack
of commercial purposes, rather than being clear that it was the
expressive elements in the work.145 Results of this kind are
dangerous for they may lead to more confusion in the case law.
The case of Donchez v. Coors Brewing Company is an example
of injustice as a result of failure to appreciate the need to protect
publicity rights.146 Plaintiff in the case was the first beer vendor to
be licensed for the Colorado Rockies. While working as a beer
vendor he created his own distinct character,147 calling himself
“Bob the Beerman.”148 Plaintiff even went so far as to file the
“Bob the Beerman” character for state trademark protection.149 He
then worked as this character in various sporting events in and out
of Colorado.150 He also performed on television and radio, and at
charitable events.151 During this time, he authored a book and
starred in a video as his character.152 Defendant beer company,
hearing about this character, pursued negotiations with the plaintiff
to use the character in an ad campaign.153 However, the beer
company ultimately declined to enter into any contractual
relationship with the plaintiff.154
Following this unsuccessful pursuit, the beer company began a
national television advertising campaign utilizing many different
expressive purpose. Id.
145
It is clear that the purpose of the magazine was (1) to parody the
movies, and (2) to illustrate the ability to alter photographs. Id. Therefore, the
article should be protected as speech and not because of a lack of actual malice.
146
392 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
147
Id. at 1214.
148
Id. Plaintiff would call out to the crowd “My favorite word in the
English language: Beer! Two favorite words: Cold Beer! Three favorite words:
Cold Beer Man!” Id. He would use beer, peanuts and Cracker Jacks as props. Id.
He would put on this act in order to entertain the crowd. Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004).
153
Id.
154
Id. No reasons are stated in this case. It can be presumed, however, that
money was the deciding factor. The beer company, perhaps, did not want to pay
for a character they could exploit for free. See text infra this section.

SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC

494

4/18/2006 12:42 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

actors and actresses portraying beer vendors.155 The beer vendors
would interact with the crowd in entertaining ways and were
referred to, by the crowd and themselves, as “Beerman.” 156 Many
who knew the plaintiff or had seen his act commented that they
thought he had licensed his character to the beer company.157
Plaintiff then filed suit in order to protect the character he
created.158
Claiming to balance the rights of the parties, the court instead
summarily favored the defendant. The court claimed to “view the
evidence, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.”159 Even so,
the court found for defendant.160 It stated that the mark “Bob the
Beerman” was too generic, and did not acquire secondary
meaning.161 “Secondary meaning” is a meaning in the minds of the
public other than the plain meaning of the words.162 The court
noted, as well, that the defendant never used “Bob the Beerman,”
but simply “Beerman.”163 As for the right of publicity, the court
155

Id.
Id. at 1214-15. The facts do not note whether the beer vendors looked
like the plaintiff. However, this does not seem likely. There were many actors
that played the part. Additionally, there were actresses.
157
Id. at 1214. This was based on a survey gathered by the Plaintiff. Id.
158
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004).
159
Id. at 1215.
160
Id. at 1223.
161
Id. at 1217.
162
Id. at 1216. An example is Seven-Up. Id. at 1218. When hearing these
words combined in such a way, it is automatically assumed that the speaker
refers to the soft drink, not the number seven going up. Id. The term “beerman”
however, did not attain such secondary meaning. Id. It was thought of as a man
that has beer. Id. This is the plain meaning. Id.
163
Id. at 1217. The court seemed to rest its decision on the fact that the
plaintiff failed to present much evidence. Id. While he did have evidence that the
term “Beerman” was identifiable to himself, he failed to present it on appeal. Id.
“For whatever reason, however, Donchez has not included that report in his
appellate appendix.” Id. Thus, the court knew of the evidence, and yet still
ignored it. Id. “Thus, we cannot consider the report and the statements included
therein in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the classification of the term ‘beerman.’” Id. This is even though the court will
incidentally be leaving the plaintiff without any evidence on the matter. Id. “In
turn, that leaves Donchez without any evidence to support his assertion that the
156
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dismissed that inquiry by stating that “the Colorado Supreme Court
does not appear to have expressly recognized this tort.”164 Thus,
the court concluded that the plaintiff did not sufficiently present
evidence that he had a protectable interest in his mark
“Beerman.”165 In this case, the court ignored the fact that the
plaintiff took the initiative to have his character protected in the
state patent office,166 that he was recognizable as the character,167
that he used the character for capital gain,168 and that the beer
company only ran the advertising campaign after meeting with
him.169 Instead of protecting creativity, the court allowed free
misappropriation of the created persona.170 Furthermore, the court
also failed to protect consumers from confusion.171 Consumers
may erroneously believe that Donchez endorsed the beer
commercials or that the character was created by the beer
company. In sum, instead of protecting ideas, publicity, trademark,
and consumer interests, the court opened the door for further

term ‘beerman’ is suggestive.” Id. Instead of considering this evidence, perhaps
not in the opinion, but as policy, the court utterly ignores it. Id.
Further, the plaintiff had evidence that his character was so prevalent, that
there were many who only knew him by his character name. Id. at 1219. The
court, again, refused to acknowledge this evidence. Id. “Donchez has not,
however, included any of those deposition excerpts in his appendix.” Id. Even
though the court knew of the evidence, and it was presented at trial, it refused to
consider it on appeal. Id.
164
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
What about the common law right of publicity? Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc.,
227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000). The Donchez court utterly disregards the
clearly established federal common law right of publicity. See id.
165
Donchez, 392 F.3d. at 1219. “In turn, we conclude he has failed to
present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find he has a protectable interest in
the mark ‘beerman.’” Id.
166
Id. at 1214.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. The implication here is that the beer company wanted the use of the
character for free. After negotiations for buying the license to use the character
stalled, the beer company used the character without paying any licensing fees.
170
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).
171
Id. at 1214.
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misappropriation.172
The court struck down the right of publicity claim because
“Donchez has not presented any evidence to establish that he, as
opposed to the character he created, is a celebrity.”173 This is
clearly faulty reasoning, in light of the fact that the court admits
that the created persona did become a celebrity.174 Therefore, it is
clear from Donchez and the previous cases that without the proper
guidance, publicity rights are in danger of being invaded by
individuals and corporations looking to exploit the images of
individuals who have already cultivated a market. Presently, courts
lack the proper guidance to adjudicate matters in which publicity
rights have been invaded by free-riders.
B. Courts Lack Proper Guidance
A uniform test is needed mainly because different courts have
adopted different tests, leading to inconsistency in the law of
publicity. The following subsections will highlight some of those
tests, along with their shortcomings.
1. The Transformative Elements Test
In Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. the Supreme
Court of California established the “transformative elements”
test.175 “The inquiry into whether a work is ‘transformative’
appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt
to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”176
172

What follows from this holding, is that now, if an advertiser wants to
use a creative character invented by someone else, the advertiser need only to
slightly alter the character and make it generic. Additionally, now that Coors
created the generic “beerman” character, it might be able to succeed, under the
court’s logic, on an action to prevent Donchez from using his “Bob the
Beerman” character. The company would, theoretically, be successful in a
trademark claim against Donchez. This is not justice.
173
Id. at 1221.
174
Id.
175
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
176
Id.
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When a work that contains a celebrity’s identity has “significant
transformative elements” it will be afforded more protection.177 A
work with such changes is afforded more First Amendment
protection because it is less likely to interfere with the economic
interests protected by the right of publicity.178 Transformative
elements are found by inquiring into where the work derives its
value from.179 When the principal value of the work comes from
the creativity, skill, and reputation of the artist, and not from the
fame of the celebrity, then it may be presumed to contain sufficient
transformative elements to warrant First Amendment protection.180
However, literal depiction of a celebrity, even if done with great
skill and talent, will be vulnerable to the right of publicity.181 The
inquiry is whether it is literal and imitative or creative elements
that predominate in the work.182 The “expression” in the work
must be something other than the likeness of the celebrity.183
The transformative elements test was adopted in Winter v. DC
Comics.184 As the California Supreme Court explains the test, its
limitations become apparent.185 The test protects against
trespassing on the commercial value of the celebrity.186
Commercial value, however, is the limit of the protection. The
177

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. The more changes a work has the less likely it is to cause consumer
confusion and dilution. See text infra § IV(B)(b).
179
Id. at 810.
180
Id.
181
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
Ironically, it is works created with less skill that may be protected. The more
skill exhibited in the work, the more likely it is to cause consumer confusion and
dilution if appropriated. This is because artistic works with great skill will look
like a literal depiction. The less skill used in creating the work, the less the work
will literally depict the celebrity. The work will be less likely to cause confusion
and dilution. This is because the work will resemble the celebrity but not be a
literal depiction. Thus, works created with less skill have a greater chance of
being protected.
182
Id.
183
Id. See infra note 287 for the facts of this case.
184
69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003).
185
Id.
186
Id.
178
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court stresses that works containing transformative elements are
“less likely to interfere with the economic interest” of the
celebrity.187 Further, in applying the test to the facts in front of it,
the court stated that a comic book that uses the likenesses of
celebrities, but turns them into fantastic characters, will not be
infringing on the celebrities’ right of publicity.188 This is because
fans will not consider the comic book a good substitute for the
actual image of the celebrities.189 This test falls short of protecting
the right of publicity because although the economic interest of
image value is protected, it still leaves endorsement value
vulnerable, as well as the privacy interests that the right of
publicity protects. It also does not protect at all against consumer
confusion as to affiliation. Therefore, this test is ineffective at
protecting the totality of the right of publicity.
2. The Rogers Balancing Test
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit suggested another
balancing test.190 Generally, under the Rogers test, the right of
publicity is “construed to apply to artistic works only where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
187

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 479. This case dealt with a comic book that used the images of
two musicians in creating fantastic worm-like characters. Id. Although the
musicians were readily recognizable in the comic book, their names were
changed and they were transformed into worm-like antiheroes. Id.
189
Id. at 470. But celebrities may want to endorse a comic book that uses
their personas as heroes. The court misses this point.
190
875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). Celebrity Ginger Rogers sued the
producers and distributors of a motion picture alleging that the title of their film
contained her name in it in violation of the rights of publicity. Id. at 996. Rogers
teamed up frequently with the late Fred Astaire. Id. The two made a very famous
dance duo. Id. Together they starred in many films. Id. They “established
themselves as paragons of style, elegance, and grace.” Id. They are of the few
elite of the entertainment world whose identities are readily called to mind by
just their first names. Id. The defendant created a film entitled “Ginger and
Fred.” Id. It was about two fictional Italian dancers that imitated Rogers and
Astaire. Id. at 996-97. The court allowed the use of the duo’s names to be used
in the title of the film, because the title had minimal artistic relevance to the film
and did not explicitly mislead as to sponsorship. Id. at 1005.
188
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public interest in free expression.”191 The court reasoned that a
misleading use of an identity that has no artistic relevance cannot
be sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.192 Expressive
works that are sold in the commercial marketplace have a dual
interest.193 While the expressive aspects need protection, there is
legitimate governmental interest to regulate in order to prevent
consumer confusion.194 Therefore, the interests are balanced to
determine which one outweighs the other.195
The Rogers balancing test has been widely adopted.196 Parks v.
LaFace Records197 explained that Rogers is a two prong test.198
The first inquiry is whether the use of the identity has artistic
relevance to the underlying work.199 If it has no relevance then the
inquiry ends and the right of publicity is upheld.200 If there is some
artistic relevance, then the second inquiry is if the use “explicitly
misleads as to the source of the content;” if so, then the right of
publicity is also upheld.201 Barring these two outcomes, the First
Amendment will protect the work.202
However, this test also comes up short in protecting the right of
publicity. The test concerns itself mainly with balancing the

191

Id. at 999.
Id.
193
Id. at 998.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 999.
196
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927 (6th Cir 2003);
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003).
197
329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
198
Id. at 451.
199
Id. at 452. “Artistic relevance” is found when there is any artistic
relationship between the identity and the underlying work. Id.
200
Id. When an artist claims that the identity is used as a “symbol” for the
work, but upon examination the claim is deemed questionable, “a legitimate
question is presented as to whether the artist’s claim is sincere or merely a guise
to escape liability.” Id. at 454.
201
Id. at 451 (emphasis added). “Explicitly misleading” is when the work
goes out of its way to convey a false connection between the celebrity and the
work. Id. at 459.
202
Id. at 451.
192
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interests behind the right of publicity and First Amendment.203
However, it gives virtually no guidance on how to determine what
the interests are. Additionally, its inquiries only seem to delve into
the confusion issue. It does not inquire, at all, into whether there is
any endorsement exploitation, or privacy interests infringed upon.
Therefore, this test inadequately protects the right of publicity.
3. The Alternative Avenues Test
The “alternative avenues” test was created by the United States
Supreme Court204 and applied to trademark cases in Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.205 This test’s inquiry is whether
there are alternative avenues for the expressive work that would
not infringe on the celebrity’s interests.206 This test is derived from
real property law.207 The main premise is that just as a landowner
may exclude speakers from his property if there are alternative
avenues available to the speaker, a celebrity may restrict the use of
his or her identity in speech if there are alternative avenues
available to the artist.208 Several courts have noted the
awkwardness of analogizing property rights in land to those of
ideas and words.209 To some, suggesting that alternative words and
means of expression can be used just as well as the ones selected
by the artist borders on silly.210 As the famous American author
Mark Twain stated, “The difference between the almost-right word
203

Id. at 450.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972).
205
836 F.2d at 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
206
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 488 (6th Cir. 2003).
207
Id. at 449; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
208
Parks, 329 F.3d at 449-50. For example, if a shopping mall owner may
exclude a speaker from his property. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567. The Court ruled
that the shopping mall owner may exclude a speaker from his property if there
are alternative avenues available to the speaker to get his message across. Id.
The parallel is thus drawn: a celebrity may prohibit the use of his name or image
so long as alternative avenues exist for the artist to communicate his idea. Parks,
329 F.3d at 450.
209
Parks, 329 F.3d at 450.
210
Id.
204
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and the right word is really a large matter—it’s the difference
between the ‘lightning-bug’ and the ‘lightning.’”211 There is no
need to “belabor the point that some words, phrases or symbols
better convey their intended meanings than others.”212 Therefore,
the alternative avenues test does not sufficiently accommodate the
public’s interest in free expression.213
C. The Key Issues Behind Fashioning an Effective Test
The primary goal of intellectual property law is maximizing
creative expression.214 The right of publicity tries to achieve this
goal by “striking a proper balance between the right of a creator to
the fruits of his labor and the rights of future creators to free
expression.”215 “It is admittedly not a simple matter to develop a
test that will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic
expression protected by the First Amendment and those that must
give way to the right of publicity.”216 Courts do not have much
guidance because few courts have truly tried to reconcile the two
rights.217 Cases dealing with the right of publicity only arise
sporadically nationwide, so there have not been many
opportunities for courts to address the matter.218 Unsure of how to
properly deal with the right, courts often look to the entire body of
law.219 However, this method allows courts to pick and choose
which cases they want to follow220 and which standard to apply.221
211

J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 527 (16th ed. 1992).
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306
(9th Cir. 1992).
213
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
214
Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
976 (10th Cir. 1996).
215
Id.
216
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001).
217
Id. at 805.
218
Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000).
219
Id. at 623.
220
See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 805. Unsure how to proceed, the court
noted, “we follow those that have in concluding that depictions of celebrities
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value
are not protected expressions under the First Amendment.” Id.
212
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In fact, some courts have expressed concerns about even applying
a standard at all.222 Thus, a uniform standard needs to be set.223
To articulate an exhaustive list of all the ways that publicity is
protected is to invite clever marketers to discover new ways to
exploit identities.224 The tests that courts have come up with thus
far have fallen short of providing adequate protection.225 Even the
consumer confusion test, which tests whether consumers will
likely be confused as to a celebrity’s connection to the product, is
inadequate because it does not balance the First Amendment right
against the right of publicity.226
Finally, courts have presented conflicting policy considerations
of the right of publicity. There are many suggestions to limit the
right. They include: even pure commercial speech may be found to
be within First Amendment protection;227 since the right is derived
221

Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989). When the
Second Circuit was faced with a right of publicity claim under the substantive
law of Oregon, the court grappled with the question of where to start in applying
a standard. Id. “We are therefore obliged to engage in the uncertain task of
predicting what the New York courts would predict what the Oregon courts
would rule as to the contours of the right of publicity under Oregon law.” Id.
222
Id. at 1005. “[W]e need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether the
First Amendment would preclude a state from giving broader application to the
right of publicity.” Id. at 1005 n.13. This is stated, despite the Supreme Court
already resolving that issue. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
563, 578-79 (1977). See also text infra §V.
223
Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2000).
224
Id. at 624-25. (explaining that if a laundry list is presented, marketers
will find a loophole around the list. (citing Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
85 F.3d 407, 413-15 (9th Cir. 1996)).
225
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2003). See also
text supra §III.
226
Id. at 449. The consumer confusion test looks at whether consumers will
erroneously attribute sponsorship or affiliation of a product to a celebrity, when
a marketer exploited that celebrity’s persona. Id. If the use is one that a celebrity
would likely endorse, i.e., use in the form of advertisement, then the use leads to
such consumer confusion. Id. If the use of the identity is to parody the identity,
then that use will not lead to consumer confusion. Id. This is because celebrities
do not endorse a self-parody. Id. See text supra §IV(B)(b) for a further
discussion of the confusion test.
227
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11028 at *2 (6th Cir.
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from privacy, a cause of action only exists during the lifetime of
the celebrity;228 not all states recognize the right;229 copyright law
preempts the right in many cases;230 an artistic work that is used
for commercial purposes is not merely a commercial product, but
is also a means of communication;231 affording celebrities a police
power to control the use of their identities will restrict public
discourse to some extent;232 the right will allow celebrities to
shield themselves from ridicule and criticism;233and it is the media,
not the celebrity, that has created a market for the identity.234
Conversely, many other courts have put forth policy
considerations supporting the right of publicity. While many
celebrities are highly compensated in their respective fields, a
majority of their revenue still comes from endorsements.235 The
right of publicity protects this endorsement value.236 Without this
protection, identities could be commercially exploited until their
value was worthless.237 No matter how much celebrities earn in
their respective fields, if they hold a property interest in their
identities, it should be protected.238 “People deserve the right to
profit from the commercial value of their identities, because, quite
2004).
228

Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
230
Toney v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2004).
231
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003).
232
Id.
233
Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
974 (10th Cir. 1996).
234
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.
1992). Thus, the celebrity does not earn the value of his identity. That value was
created for him or her.
235
See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 963. “Since 1966, MLBPA [Major
League Baseball Players Association] has entered into group licensing
arrangements for a variety of products, such as candy bars, cookies, cereals, and,
most importantly, baseball trading cards, which generate over seventy percent of
its licensing revenues.” Id. (emphasis added).
236
Id. at 974.
237
Id.
238
See id. This is because “publicity rights stem from some notion of
natural rights.” Id. at 975.
229
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simply, they’ve earned it.”239 A celebrity’s identity is his authentic
seal.240 The identity carries the good name and will of the
celebrity.241 When another wrongfully uses the identity of someone
else who has cultivated a good name and will, the user does so
with the expectation that others will be influenced by the
reputation which comes along with that good name and will.242
This wrongful procurement allows the borrower to “ride the coattails” of the celebrity, which itself is an injury to the celebrity, even
without tarnishing the reputation.243 Thus, unless the borrower’s
use is so foreign to the owner’s use to ensure against any
assimilation of the two, it is unlawful.244
Furthermore, by “[a]llowing individuals the exclusive right to
capitalize on their persona, like copyright law, [they are
encouraged] to invest in developing their skills and talents.”245
Publicity rights also provide incentives to excel in the fields of
sports and entertainment.246 For instance, there are relatively very
few actors who manage to create immediately recognizable
identities, an invaluable asset to an actor.247 The protection of this
value as a property asset is an incentive to becoming the best in the
entertainment field.248 Additionally, rights of publicity are
consistent with the Copyright Act,249 so as not to be preempted by

239

Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
974 (10th Cir. 1996).
240
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467
F.Supp. 366, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972,
974 (2d Cir. 1928)).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. Thus, right of publicity does not focus on tarnishing of name or
image. See id.
244
Id. Such a foreign use will not offend the celebrity. See text infra §
IV(A).
245
Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
246
Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
974 (10th Cir. 1996).
247
Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001).
248
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974.
249
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998).
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copyright law.250
Any distinctive aspect of the persona that identifies the
celebrity is protected under the right of publicity.251 A plaintiff
merely has to show commercial value in the identity.252 The right
is not limited to false endorsement.253 The use of a catch phrase
that is distinctive to the celebrity,254 a slightly altered picture of a
famous driver’s race car,255 a drawing of a nude black boxer
identified by a distinctive nickname,256 and the famous nickname
of a professional football player as the name of a leg shaving
cream257 were all found to violate the right of publicity.
250

Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2000). The
only time the right will be preempted is when a celebrity already licensed out his
rights to another, and then is disputing the licensee’s use of the identity in mass
media. Id.
251
Id. at 624-25.
252
Id. at 624.
253
Id. at 624 n.1.
254
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983). Carson was the famous host of the “Tonight Show,” which ran five
nights a week on broadcast television. Id. at 832. For twenty years Carson was
introduced onto the show with the line “Here’s Johnny.” Id. Appellee made and
rented Here’s Johnny portable toilets. Id. at 833. Shortly after appellee went into
business Carson brought an action against it. Id. The court ruled that in using the
famous phrase the celebrity’s identity had been misappropriated and exploited.
Id.
255
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th
Cir. 1974). Plaintiff is an internationally known and recognized racecar driver.
Id. at 822. Plaintiff also “individualized” his racecar, by making it identifiable as
his. Id. In a commercial produced by defendant, the defendant used the
plaintiff’s car. Id. Plaintiff’s face was not visible. Id. The court found that the
distinguishable racecar would be enough of a likeness of the plaintiff, to bar its
use. Id. at 827.
256
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Ali was
heavyweight boxing champion of the world. Id. at 725. A portrait of the boxer
was depicted without permission in an issue of Playgirl Magazine. Id. The
portrait depicted a nude black man sitting in the corner of a boxing ring. Id. The
boxer was referred to as “the Greatest.” Id. at 727. This was Ali’s nickname. Id.
The nude boxer was clearly recognizable as Ali. Id. at 725. The court found this
was a misappropriation of the boxer’s persona, and granted the boxer an
injunction. Id.
257
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son., Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wisc.
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Presently, there is no test that produces consistent outcomes in
matters of publicity rights.258 Therefore, a new test must be
proposed. However, this new test must insulate from restriction
works with sufficient artistic relevance that are ambiguous or only
implicitly misleading, but leave vulnerable works that are
explicitly misleading as to source or content, or have minimal or
no artistic relevance at all.259 Only in this manner will the test
resolve the conflicting interests of the First Amendment and the
individual’s interests in rights of publicity.
IV. A NEW THREE-PRONG TEST TO CONSISTENTLY ADJUDICATE
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The following section outlines the proposed right of publicity
test and illustrates its application and effectiveness with case-based
hypotheticals.

1979). Hirsch, a professional football player was nicknamed “Crazylegs.” Id. at
131. Defendant used that nickname to market their products. Id. at 132. The
court found that such misappropriation is enough to be considered unlawful. Id.
at 140.
258
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2003). Even
the Rogers balancing test comes up short in this respect. See text supra
§III(B)(2). No one test that is already in case law adequately balances the
interests of artists and celebrities. However, it is possible to suggest a single test
that can answer the right of publicity question in every case. See text infra §
IV(A).
259
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989). The court states
how federal trademark law accommodates consumer and artistic interest. “It
insulates from restriction titles with at least minimal artistic relevance that are
ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves vulnerable to claims of
deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to source or content, or that
have no artistic relevance at all.” Id. Note the higher standard that Rogers
provides. Id. That is because titles deserve more protection than ordinary works.
Id. at 997. The new test suggested here does just this. See text infra § III(B)(2).
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A. The New Test
1. The “Purpose” Prong
The first inquiry goes to the purpose of the defendant’s use of
another’s persona. When there is no expressive speech or action,
there is no First Amendment protection.260 Exploiting an identity
without adding any expressive elements will violate publicity
rights and will not invoke First Amendment protections.261 A work
in which the expressive element, such as a parody, is subservient to
the commercial element, such as the sale of a product, will also not
be shielded from right of publicity claims.262 Like the
transformative elements test, this first purpose prong asks whether
there are any additional elements added to the work that illuminate
the purpose of the work.263 An important inquiry is whether the
260

Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 (2001)
(finding that if the “commercial aspects [of a work] are inextricably entwined
with [its] expressive elements,” the work will have “a measure of First
Amendment protection”).
261
Id. (use of altered movie still in print ad to sell clothes); Newcombe v.
Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998) (using a baseball pitcher’s
image in printed beer ad); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409
(9th Cir. 1996) (use of basketball player’s former name in television
commercial); Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1992)
(imitating famous singer’s voice in snack-food commercial); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of sound-alike rendition of
singer’s song in a car commercial) (all not protected by First Amendment).
262
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir.
1992). Additionally, where the parody is invoked in bad faith, used in order to
justify exploiting of an image, it will not be protected. Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 375 (D.C.N.Y.
1979). When film footage of a celebrity is used to sell itself, and is not
accompanied by editorial comments, the film will not be protected. Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Even an
impersonation, if not accompanied by any comment, will not be protected.
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding that
an Elvis impersonator’s concerts constituted a copying of Elvis Presley’s
persona and was not protected by the First Amendment).
263
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal.
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creative elements predominate.264 If the purpose of the work is to
express something,265 then it triggers potential First Amendment
protection. However, if the purpose is to exploit the image for
monetary gain with very little creative manipulation of the image,
then it leans more toward violating the publicity rights of the
celebrity.266
2. The “Confusion/Dilution” Prong
After the purpose of the work is determined, courts should next
examine the harmful effects of the identity exploitation, namely,
confusion and dilution.267 A court in a right of publicity case uses
2001).
264

Id. at 810 (“We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”). This test is
not the end of the inquiry, however. In Winter v. DC Comics, the court applied
the transformative elements test. 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003). The court found
that a comic book exploited the likenesses of two musicians, but had creative
elements, and was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 479. The comic
book had clear appropriations of the musicians. Id. at 476. The comic included
long white hair, albino features, and tall black hat that were signatures of the
plaintiffs. Id. Additionally, the title use, “Autumns of Our Discontent,” was
clearly an appropriation of the plaintiffs’ names. Id. The plaintiffs’ name was
Winter. Id. There is a Shakespearian phrase “winter of our discontent” in
Richard III, act I, scene I, lines 1-2. Id. at 476 n.1. Even with evidence of clear
appropriation, the court found for the defendant. Id. at 479. That is because there
were transformative elements, like making the musicians into alien worm
creatures. Id. Thus, the transformative elements test, that does not consider
confusion, is clearly only a start to the inquiry. See text supra § III(B)(1).
265
This expression must be something other than the likeness, or to sell a
product. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809.
266
After this inquiry, the harmful effects must be determined. These are
confusion and dilution. The reason why the inquiry cannot end here, is that the
full breadth of the policy considerations cannot be evaluated until the harmful
effects of the work are determined. See text supra §III(B). The more the work is
used to sell, the more it is commercial speech and is afforded less First
Amendment protection. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
267
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 948 (6th Cir 2003)
(Clay, J., dissenting).
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the eight-factor inquiry adopted by courts in trademark cases in
order to measure the amount of confusion created by the identity
exploitation. 268 The eight factors are not used in a precise
mathematical way, but merely as a guide.269 As trademark and
right of publicity claims are similar in that the harm to plaintiffs in
both cases revolves around confusion and dilution, these eight
factors will be strong indicators of right of publicity violations. A
key factor in the inquiry is whether the use of the identity in the
product or work will create consumer confusion as to source,
affiliation, or sponsorship.270 That is, the court must ask whether
consumers believe that a celebrity is associated with the product.271
A second factor is whether the use of the identity in the product or
work will dilute the value of the identity.272 This assumes that any
profit off of the fame of a celebrity would likely diminish the value
of the celebrity’s endorsement value.273 If identities are used
268

Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2000). The
eight factors are: (1) strength of plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the goods;
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent in
selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id. at 62627. There is no need to prove actual confusion. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329
F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003).
269
Landham, 227 F.3d at 627.
270
Parks,329 F.3d at 445-46.
271
Id. at 445. Confusion and dilution may be intertwined. If the use of an
identity will lead consumers to believe that the celebrity is behind the product,
then that is a product that the celebrity may want to endorse. It follows that
confusion is found more easily in products or works that the celebrity would be
more likely to endorse. If a celebrity would be less likely to endorse a product or
work, then the use of an identity will be less likely to cause consumer confusion.
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
272
Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 2004). See also
text supra § I(B).
273
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1989). Taking a free
ride off of the fame is tantamount to unjust enrichment. Cardtoons, L.C., v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). Even
using the identity of one celebrity to make fun of another will violate the right of
publicity. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
However, using a celebrity’s identity to make fun of that celebrity is fully First
Amendment protected. Id.
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without paying for them, then identities lose their marketability.274
Accordingly the higher degree of confusion and dilution the more
harmful the identity exploitation is, and the more vulnerable to
attack the work becomes.275
3. The “Balancing” Prong
After determining the purpose of a work as a function of its
expressive elements and harmful identity exploitation in the first
two prongs, public interest concerns are evaluated.276 The policy
considerations behind the right of publicity are balanced against
those of free expression.277 A court will have to evaluate the extent
of the commercial aspects of the work,278 coupled with the extent
of harm it will likely cause,279 and determine whether or not the
public interest in a free marketplace of ideas prevails. For instance,
if the purpose of the work is to sell itself or a product, and it will
likely lead to consumer confusion and dilution,280 then the right of
publicity will prevail. However, if the work’s main purpose is to
express an idea, and there is little likelihood of confusion or
dilution,281 then the First Amendment will protect the work. In this
way, the elements are truly in balance.282

274

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
After determining the amount of expression and harmful exploitation a
work has, it is then time to balance the interests behind rights of publicity and
free expression.
276
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
277
Id.
278
I.e., what its purpose is.
279
I.e., the level of confusion and dilution.
280
I.e., in advertising.
281
I.e., a parody.
282
When the commercial, confusion, and dilution aspects are found more
prevalent, the interest in protecting this work absconds. As the expressive and
creative elements start to dominate, then the right of publicity gives way to the
protection of the First Amendment. See text supra §III(B).
275
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B. Application of the New Test
Applying the new test to different hypothetical situations
inspired by actual cases will demonstrate how the test is properly
applied. The hypotheticals will also show how the proposed test
can be uniformly applied to differing types of right of publicity
actions.
1. Appropriation of Photograph Case
A publisher creates a monthly calendar.283 In the calendar, the
producer uses multiple photographic images of the legendary
baseball player Babe Ruth. The baseball great appears three times
in the calendar. Ruth’s daughters bring an action asserting the right
of publicity along with state and federal trademark claims.
Applying the new test to the right of publicity claim, the court
will first determine the purpose of the image appropriation. The
court will look at the calendar to find out if the use of Ruth’s image
is to express an idea or to sell the calendar. The purpose is likely to
sell as many calendars as possible by including photographs of the
American icon. There is no commentary accompanying the
photographs. There are virtually hundreds of different kinds of
calendars on the market. The photographs were probably necessary
283

This hypothetical is taken from the facts in Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.,
894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990). Baseball has been America’s national pastime
since the early 1900s. Id. at 580. One such ball player, “Babe Ruth[,] hardly
needs an introduction.” Id. Ruth was often paid by manufacturers for the use of
his picture on their products. Id. at 581. The defendant calendar maker created a
calendar. Id. This calendar did not feature Ruth’s name anywhere on the front or
back cover. Id. The calendar contained pictures of many great baseball players.
Id. The calendar also included three photographs of Babe Ruth. Id. The court
found for the defendant. Id. at 583. It stated that, “a photograph of a human
being, unlike a portrait of a fanciful cartoon character, is not inherently
‘distinctive’ in the trademark sense.” Id. The court concluded that an ordinarily
prudent consumer would think that although the celebrity is the subject matter of
the calendar it by no means indicates sponsorship. Id. at 585. This is clearly
misguided reasoning. The court does not explain why a consumer, seeing all the
photographs of the celebrity, will think that it was an appropriation and not from
the celebrity himself.
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to give the calendar a marketing edge. Thus, the primary purpose
appears to be to use the image for commercial purposes.
Next, the court must determine whether the photographs cause
confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship, or source, and dilution by
lessening the endorsement value of the image. The calendar may
confuse consumers, who, upon seeing the photographs in the
calendar, may think that it has some affiliation or approval from
Babe Ruth’s estate.284 The calendar may also cause dilution
because a calendar is something that a celebrity may want to sell
endorsement rights for in order to make a profit. In fact, celebrities
endorse a variety of common products.285 In this circumstance, the
defendant’s free use of the photograph in the calendar likely
diminishes the endorsement value of the celebrity’s image.286
Thus, there is harm in the exploitation.
Finally, the competing interests—free expression on one hand,
and privacy and property on the other hand—must be balanced.
Exploitation for commercial purposes is present, with few, if any,
expressive elements. Ruth’s image was inserted in the calendar in
order to differentiate the calendar from others in the eyes of
consumers. This was to help sell more calendars. Additionally,
there is the high likelihood of confusion and dilution. Many
consumers would believe that Ruth’s license holders endorsed the
calendar. Additionally, using the image without paying for it
decreases the endorsement value of the image. Marketers will not
want to pay for an image that they can use for free. Therefore, the
right of publicity outweighs that of free expression.287
284
285

Or, whomever holds the rights to his image.
The list includes T-shirts, watches, lunch boxes, photo frames, and

towels.
286

Advertisers and product designers will not pay for likenesses that can be
obtained for free. While this is one example, this can create a dangerous
precedent.
287
After all, there is no expression in this product.
A similar hypothetical can be drawn from Comedy III Prod., Inc. v.
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The Three Stooges were a huge comedy
hit in their day. The group was made up by Moe, Jerome “Curly” Howard, and
Larry Fein. Starting in vaudeville and then later in movie shorts, the trio were at
the top of their profession for twenty years. During these years they developed
their own style incorporating “nyuk-nyuk,” “whoop-whoop-whoop,” eye pokes,
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2. Appropriation of Identity
An actor stars in a low-budget movie which unexpectedly
becomes very popular.288 Afterwards, a toy company starts to
produce, market, and sell action figures based on the characters in
the movie. Each of these figures, though diminutive, have a very
clear resemblance to the actors that played the parts in the
movie.289 At no time did the actor sign a waiver of his rights to his

and head conks. Their images have become synonymous with comedy and a
distinct brand of physical humor. Defendant artist, who had over twenty-five
years of experience, draw a depiction of the famous trio. He sold that depiction
on lithographs, silkscreen, and on T-shirts. The charcoal drawing was original in
that it did not copy any existing photograph of the trio. It did, however, literally
depict the comedian group. Comedy III, the registered owner of all rights to the
former comedy act, sued to protect their publicity rights.
Plugging this fact pattern into the new test is simple. The purpose of the
charcoal drawing is to literally depict the trio. That is, to capitalize off of their
fame. The depiction was sold as lithographs, and put on T-shirts, in order to sell
to fans. There was no message in the drawing, other than to identify the images
of The Three Stooges. While artwork is protected by the First Amendment, that
is expressive art, or art that does not violate anyone else’s rights. A work that
exploits the image of a celebrity will not be automatically protected.
Consumer confusion is very likely in this case. Since the depictions are
literal, and were sold as prints or on T-shirts, consumers will very likely be led
to believe that The Three Stooges were affiliated with the products. While all
members of the trio are dead, their rights belong to Comedy III. As for dilution,
T-shirts and prints are common avenues for celebrities to sell endorsements.
Endorsements are not only sold for advertising, but for product placement as
well. Therefore, by using the images without compensating the celebrity, it
causes a dilution of the value of the identity. Additionally, it is taking a free ride
on the fame of the celebrity. This is unjust enrichment.
Balancing First Amendment and publicity rights are relatively simple. There are
not that many expressive elements in the work, but there is a lot of harmful
exploitation. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff.
The right of publicity should be firmly upheld.
288
This hypothetical is taken from the facts in Landham v. Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
289
In Landham the toys that were made were tiny, with no clear
resemblance at all to any of the actors. Id. at 622. In fact, the toy designer
purposely avoided any resemblance. Id. Therefore, no right of publicity
violation was found. Id. at 627.
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character in the movie, and the production company never
contracted with him to retain all marketing rights in the film.290
The actor sues to protect his publicity rights.
In applying the proposed three-pronged test, the court first
looks at the purpose of the toy company using the likeness of the
actor. The clear purpose of the toys is twofold. One, to create a toy
that evokes the character played in the move. Two, based on this
evocation, sell the toys. Thus, the predominant purpose is to
exploit the character’s image to sell the toys.
Next, the court weighs the confusion and dilution. The
appropriation may not be harmful. First, as to confusion, most
consumers would probably think that the movie, not the actor, is
associated with the toy. Unless otherwise demonstrated, few
consumers would think that the actor solely authorized the making
of the toy. In fact, it is likely that the consumers do not care if the
toy looks like the actor or not. The main purpose of the action
figure is to evoke the image of the character, not necessarily the
actor that starred in the role.291 Therefore, there is not much
likelihood of consumer confusion as to affiliation.
Dilution would have a similar analysis. While an actor may
want to endorse action figures which depict his or her likeness,
there may not be an actual opportunity to do so. The lack of an
opportunity is because when a toy company obtains a license from
movie producers, often it is only after an actor has waived his or
her rights to the characters.292 Therefore, dilution may not be
290

Presumably, most major production companies make it standard
practice to reserve all marketing rights stemming from their films, but in the
case of an indie film, such a precaution may not seem critical. Therefore, this
hypothetical contemplates a situation in which all bets are off when it comes to
the actor exploiting his own character.
291
The toy would have the same appeal no matter who played in the role.
Although some main characters become famous because of who starred in the
role, i.e., the Terminator starring Arnold Schwarzennegger, the majority become
famous because of the movie. Thus, in most instances, consumers do not care
who the toy looks like, as long as it is the character from the movie. This is
especially true for characters that wear masks and the like, concealing the
identity of the actor. Some examples are Darth Vader from Star Wars, Batman,
and Spider-Man.
292
Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2000).
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present because although this particular toy company can produce
the toy that evokes the image, others that want to evoke the image
would still have to obtain a license.
In balancing, however, the right of publicity would prevail.
While the public interest in preventing publicity exploitation is
weak in this case, due to the lack of harmful exploitation, there is
no expression that is to be protected. The identity on the toy is
clearly commercially related. Therefore, in a case where the actor
did not waive his right to the character he plays, a toy company
will have to seek his permission before creating a toy that evokes
his likeness.293
293

This will lead to toy manufacturers having to get licensing from the
studio and from the actor. However, that is only if the toy looks like the actor. If
it only looks like the character, then licensing will only need to be obtained from
the movie studio. Id. at 626.
This can be compared to a hypothetical drawn from Hoffman v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). Dustin Hoffman plays a
character that dresses up like a woman in order to get a part on a daytime
television soap opera. A memorable still from the movie is a shot of the male
actor dressing up like a woman. He is wearing a long-sleeved red evening gown.
Years later a magazine wants to show off its prowess in computer graphics. It
takes the famous still, along with many others, and alters them. The article
replaced the bodies of the famous actors and replaced them with male models
sporting the fall fashion. In the case of this particular actor, it kept the head as is,
but replaced the body with that of a male model. The model was wearing a
spaghetti strapped, cream colored, evening gown. It included a caption that read
“Dustin Hoffman isn’t a drag in the butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler
and Ralph Lauren heels.” The actor then sued to protect his publicity value.
The purpose of the article was to express an idea. That idea is what actors in
famous roles would look like wearing the fall line. The purpose was not merely
to exploit the image, but to lampoon it. The parody is not of the actor, but
putting the actor in a silly situation. Thus, the lampooning was more of the still
than of the actor. Either way, the expressive element stays the same. That is, to
illustrate the power of computer graphics. The caption under the altered
photograph went along with this theme.
There is little likelihood that consumers will think any of the actors,
including Dustin Hoffman, is affiliated with the article. For one, it is in a
magazine. It is very unlikely that magazines have to pay celebrities every time
they want to include an image along with an article. Another reason, is that it
lampoons the memorable roles. Few actors would want to reduce their
memorable role to a scene of them in women’s clothing. As for dilution, it
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3. Appropriation of Image Case
A poster for sale is created that depicts a robot.294 The robot
has male features, an African-American complexion, and a bald
head. The robot is wearing black high-top basketball sneakers, a
red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the
number 23 on the jersey.295 The poster depicts the robot dunking a
basketball one-handed, stiff armed. The arms and legs are spread
out, like scissors, and the tongue is hanging out. Seeing this, famed
basketball player Michael Jordan296 sues the poster company under
a right of publicity claim.297 Jordan asserts that the robot is
depicting his likeness.
Consider the three prongs of the proposed test.298 First, the
purpose prong. The robot appears to be evoking the image of
Michael Jordan: it is wearing a uniform that is very similar to his
Chicago Bulls299 uniform, “23” is the number he wore, and the
follows the same reasoning. That is, it does not diminish endorsement value,
because celebrities will not want to endorse such an article. Additionally, it is an
article, and celebrities do not usually endorse articles.
The policy here is clear. The article contains definite expressive elements.
The exploitation of the identity is necessary to convey the ideas expressed. This
exploitation is also not harmful. Therefore, the public interest in free expression
clearly prevails.
294
This hypothetical is posed in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
295
While this is famed Chicago Bulls basketball player Michael Jordan’s
number, it does not say “Jordan” or “Bulls” anywhere on the uniform.
296
Former professional basketball superstar.
297
The hypothetical, as posed in White, has this image as part of an
advertisement. 971 F.2d at 1399. It is used as a plain poster in order to isolate
the image exploitation aspect. If it would be used as an advertisement, then there
would be even more reason to believe the image represents commercial speech.
298
“Considered individually, the robot’s physical attributes, its dress, and
its stance tell us little.” White, F.2d at 1399. The court notes, however, that
“Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any sports viewer who has
registered a discernable pulse in the past five years would reach: the ad is about
Michael Jordan.” Id.
299
A professional basketball team, part of the National Basketball
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arms, legs, and tongue are all in his signature positions. The use of
the image appears to be in order to sell the poster. A poster is only
sold because of the image on it, not for the value it has as paper.
The image, however, does contain expressive elements. Here, the
poster undoubtedly imitates the plaintiff basketball superstar. This
makes the poster a parody. The impersonation, however, is the end
of the expression. The poster does not comment specifically on the
ballplayer. It merely is expressing that this robot is like Michael
Jordan.300 Thus, there are commercial and expressive elements,
neither set particularly stronger than the other.
Second is the confusion and dilution prong in order to judge
the harmfulness of the appropriation. In this case there is a
likelihood of confusion present, but it is not very strong. While a
celebrity will want to sponsor posters of him or herself, a robotic
depiction is arguably not the usual goal. Therefore, a consumer
may think that the celebrity had something to do with the poster,
but it is not a very strong inference.301 On the same token, this
depiction is not the type of parody that lampoons the player, and so
it is not unthinkable that the player somehow approves or is
affiliated with the poster.302 As for diluting endorsement value, this
depiction is not an avenue that the player usually would endorse. A
player would endorse a poster with an actual image, perhaps, but
not one of a robot that merely depicts his likeness. However, this
poster is taking a free ride on the fame of the celebrity. The artist
Association.
300
Expressing likeness is not considered creative expression. Comedy III
Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
301
Using the eight-factor test as guidance, confusion is found. The
characteristic pose along with the number and red uniform lead to a likelihood
of confusion. There is a strong mark, the goods are related and similar,
marketing channels are the same, there is a low degree of purchaser care for
posters, and the intent of using the mark was to exploit the image. As for
evidence of actual confusion and expansion of product lines, those lean toward
the defendant. Therefore, there would be confusion found.
302
To a certain extent, celebrities welcome well thought out parodies.
Parodies done in good taste, that don’t criticize the celebrity, but merely make
fun, are found to be endorsed by the celebrities themselves. In fact, in many
occasions celebrities play cameo parts in movies or in advertisements that poke
fun at them.
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likely used a robot instead of an actual image of Jordan in order to
escape paying endorsement fees. The parody is a way to market
posters of the celebrity to fans without paying compensation.303
Therefore, there is only a small likelihood of confusion, but a great
amount of dilution.
As for balancing the free expression and property and privacy
interests, the interests are well-balanced; that is, neither interest is
particularly strong. Although there is clear image exploitation, the
exploitation would not likely be considered injurious to the
celebrity’s publicity value because celebrities do not generally
endorse parodies. At the same time, however, there is not much
expression in this work. While the poster expresses that the player
sticks his tongue out while playing basketball, that is the totality of
the expressed ideas. This image use is an example of the artist
capitalizing off of the fame of the celebrity. Rights of publicity
protect such unjust enrichment and freeloading. Free expression
does not have much at stake in this work because little is known of
the artist’s opinion of the basketball player. Ultimately, an
injunction to protect the ballplayer’s persona should likely be
granted to the ballplayer because the purpose of the poster is
commercial gain, and not substantive commentary on Jordan.304
303

Depicting the celebrity in this way will get around paying for the
identity. Although the celebrity will not want to endorse this poster, but the
celebrity will want to endorse posters. By not using any actual image of the
celebrity, the artist is trying to market a product to the fans of the basketball
player without having to pay licensing fee. Therefore, there is dilution. This is
an example of taking a free ride off of the fame of a celebrity without
compensating the celebrity. This then, is also unjust enrichment.
304
The defendant can easily escape liability in this case if there was more
expression in the poster. Perhaps show money trailing out of the pocket of the
uniform, or add springs to the bottom of the sneakers. However, this may defeat
the artist’s purpose. It seems that the artist may want to market this poster to
those who hold Michael Jordan in high regard. Therefore, the artist would not
want to lampoon the celebrity this way.
A similar hypothetical is derived from the facts in White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). An electronics company created a vast
print ad marketing campaign. The main theme was showing its products in the
context of twenty years in the future. It used a mixture of celebrities and
common items for the campaign. An example is showing raw meat with the
caption “Revealed to be health food, year 2025.” Another showed a talk-show
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host in front of an American flag with the caption “Presidential Candidate, year
2020.” All of the advertisements depicting celebrities were done with
permission. The one exception was the one that is up for dispute. This
advertisement featured a robot with female features, white gown, pearls, and
blond wig. It was posed in front of a game board which was instantly recognized
as the Wheel of Fortune game-show set. The look and stance of the robot was
clearly modeled after Wheel of Fortune game-show hostess Vanna White. The
caption read “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D..” This advertisement was
selling VCRs. Upon seeing this ad, the hostess sued to protect her identity.
The purpose of the advertisement is clearly to sell the VCRs. Although it
parodies the game show and its hostess, that is just an incidental purpose of the
commercial message. The parody message is clearly expressive. It states that the
game show is very popular and will still be running twenty years in the future, as
illustrating, in exaggerated form, the famous aspects of its hostess. Still, the
main purpose of the advertisement is to be an advertisement. That is, to sell the
VCRs.
This advertisement will not likely lead to consumer confusion. Consumers
will not think that the game show is affiliated with the ad. If the game show
would be affiliated with the ad, the depiction of the game show would be a lot
more literal. Since the ad only depicts the readily recognizable aspects of the
show without any literal depictions, it is most likely viewed as a parody.
Parodies of this kind are not likely affiliated with the producers of the game
show, even if it does depict the show in a positive light. It is less likely affiliated
with Vanna White, its hostess. However, there might be some confusion as to
permission or approval of the depiction. As for dilution, there is no direct
diminishing of the celebrity value. The hostess will not likely endorse such a
parody. It is not literal enough. However, the ad does capitalize off of her
famous identity. Her persona is used without compensating her. Thus, the ad is
taking a free ride off of her hard work and talent. Therefore, there is dilution,
exploitation, and unjust enrichment.
It is not simple to balance these rights. There clearly is a message. The
advertisement parodies the game-show and its hostess, and therefore has
expressive elements. By the same token, the purpose of the advertisement
reveals its commercial purpose. Additionally, the identity exploitation is
harmful. Although there is not a strong likelihood of consumer confusion, and
no direct dilution, there is the capitalizing off of the identity. This capitalization
diminishes endorsement value by finding an alternative way to reach fans of the
celebrity without paying for licensing rights. Therefore, even though this is a
close case, summary judgment should have been given to plaintiff.
This hypothetical is an example of a parody not done correctly. When a
parody is not done correctly, it loses its expressive potency. When a parody is
intertwined with commercial elements, like trying to sell a product, then the
parody is less effective in it of itself. Therefore, it receives less protection than

SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC

520

4/18/2006 12:42 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

CONCLUSION
The right of publicity is a difficult and elusive area of law. The
right’s basis in two different areas of law has caused more
confusion than comfort, as demonstrated by the various and
divergent outcomes in cases dealing with the right of publicity. In
exhibiting both privacy and property aspects the right has a wide
range of interests. However, while the interests of the right are
apparent, courts have historically struggled to determine what
protections the rights of publicity afford. A primary concern is the
interplay between the right and the First Amendment. By
protecting the marketplace of ideas and expression, the First
Amendment puts a limitation on the breadth of the right of
publicity. Intellectual property and the right of publicity in turn,
put limitations on the First Amendment as well. There is great
dispute among courts as to how far each of these limitations
extend. Unsure, courts have been more inclined to limit the right of
publicity than the First Amendment.
The First Amendment is by far not absolute. The First
Amendment’s protection extends only to the expressive elements
of a work. A work will incidentally be protected if it contains
sufficient expressive elements. When there are commercial or
identity-exploitative elements in a work, the work will be afforded
less protection. Thus is the interaction between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity. In a work that contains both
expressive and identity exploitative elements, there will be friction
between the rights of free expression and publicity. Each right will
protect its respective interest in the work. Therefore, a court must
balance the rights to find which one outweighs the other.
Precise balancing is what has troubled courts. Many courts find
the task daunting and have shied away from it. Others have tackled
it head on, albeit misguidedly. Still others have tried to gingerly
strike a delicate balance. All these approaches, however, have met
little success. The task of balancing the rights still looms
dauntingly before courts. The unbalanced and haphazard

parodies whose purpose is to convey a message.
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approaches used have only led to more confusion.305 Such
approaches have also led to injustice.306 Aside from the courts, the
parties in right of publicity disputes are left without any direction.
Celebrities are unsure of how to plead a right of publicity case,
while artists have no clear guideline of how much their work may
incorporate the identity of another.
A growing concern is the lack of appreciation some courts have
for the policy considerations for the right of publicity. Many courts
choose only to list the public policy against the right which helps
justify limiting the right. These courts, though, are unwittingly
diminishing the property right of the celebrity. No good reason has
been put forward to explain why the First Amendment’s right of
free expression should automatically trump the Fifth Amendment’s
right to property. Without a clear understanding of the public
interest in upholding the right, courts will continue to disregard it.
On the contrary, courts should realize the great public interest that
the right of publicity carries. The right of publicity prevents the
misappropriation of a valuable identity, one that the celebrity
worked very hard in creating. The right gives the celebrity the sole
right to exploit his or her identity. The right also prevents unjust
enrichment, consumer confusion, and the dilution of the celebrity’s
property interest. In this way, it is quite akin to trademark law.
Therefore, better understanding and respect should be paid toward
the property interests the right is protecting.
In light of the need to protect both the valuable identity and the
free market of ideas, a proper balancing test is needed. Courts
should adopt an approach that will incorporate the interests of both
parties. In order for this to happen, courts must acknowledge the
need to uphold the purposes of both parties’ rights. Only then can a
proper balance be struck. This Note proposed a three-pronged test
that can accomplish the goal of balancing the rights. The first
prong is to consider the purpose of the work in question. This will
determine if the work is primarily to convey a message, or for the
most part trying to sell something. The next prong is to consider
how harmful the identity exploitation is. If the persona use will
305
306

See text supra § III(A)-(B).
See text supra § III(A).
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likely cause consumer confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship
then it will be found to be harmful. Persona use will also be
harmful if the use dilutes the value of the identity it is using, or
tries to capitalize on the fame of another. Finally, the last prong
balances the opposing interests in the work. The expressive
components are weighed against the commercial and identity
exploitative components to find if the First Amendment or the right
of publicity will prevail. In this way, publicity and free expression
rights are firmly upheld. With this test, courts and parties will have
clear guidance of how to act in regard to the identity rights of
celebrities.
Indeed, because of the necessity in upholding both the public
interest in free expression and right of publicity, jurisdictions
nationwide are urged to adopt the right of publicity in this way.
The states that have not yet adopted any form of the right of
publicity should do so immediately. The states that have already
adopted the right via the common law or statute should consider
modifying their case law to adequately protect both of these
interests. The test this Note suggests may be adopted or used as
guidance. When limiting or expanding the right of publicity, the
public has much at stake. Artists and merchants need guidelines for
determining when identity exploitation is permissible.
Furthermore, celebrities deserve protection for their identities and
personas. Thus, many members of our society have a stake in how
the balance is struck.307 Federal courts should acknowledge that
there exists a federal common law right of publicity as well.
Thereby, all courts should consider the need for adoption of a
formal balancing standard. As the Supreme Court has not heard a
right of publicity case since 1977, it is quite obvious that the issue
is overdue before the Court. If the Court carefully strikes a proper
balance between the two competing interests, other courts
nationwide will finally obtain some clarity. Only then will this
issue no longer daunt courts, but be one of the many laws in our
307

Indeed, living in a capitalist society, every member of society has the
potential to become an artist, merchant, celebrity, or all three. Therefore, every
member of society has a stake in how the right of publicity and its interplay with
the First Amendment is defined. Therefore, it is imperative for courts to adopt a
clear method for balancing the rights.
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